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Abstract
Fault-tolerant consensus has been studied extensively in the literature, because it is one of
the most important distributed primitives and has wide applications in practice. This paper
surveys important results on fault-tolerant consensus in message-passing networks, and the
focus is on results from the past decade. Particularly, we categorize the results into two
groups: new problem formulations and practical applications. In the first part, we discuss
new ways to define the consensus problem, which includes larger input domains, link fault
models, different network models . . . etc, and briefly discuss the important techniques. In the
second part, we focus on Crash Fault-Tolerant (CFT) systems that use Paxos or Raft, and
Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) systems. We also discuss Bitcoin, which can be related to
solving Byzantine consensus in anonymous systems, and compare Bitcoin with BFT systems
and Byzantine consensus.
1 Introduction
Fault-tolerant consensus has received significant attentions over the past three decades [20, 89]
since the seminal work by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [110, 81] – some important results
include solving consensus efficiently and identifying time and communication complexity under
different models – please refer to [20, 89, 112, 112] for these fundamental results. In this paper,
we survey recent efforts on fault-tolerant consensus in message-passing networks, with the focus
on results from the past decade. References [48, 111, 32] presented early surveys on the topic.
To complement theses prior works, we present this survey from two new angles:
• Exploration of New Problem Formulations: Lots of different consensus problems have been
introduced in the past ten years for achieving more complicated tasks and accommodating
different system and network requirements. New problem formulations include enriched
∗A shorter version of the survey is published in SIROCCO 2016.
†Revised on August 2016 to improve the presentation.
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correctness properties, different fault models, different communication networks, and differ-
ent input/output domains. For this part, we focus on the comparison of recently proposed
problem formulations and relevant techniques.
• Exploration of Practical Applications: Consensus has been applied in many practical sys-
tems. Here, we focus on three types of applications: (i) crash-tolerant consensus algorithms
(mainly Paxos [78] and Raft [105]) and their applications in real-world systems, (ii) PBFT
(Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerance) [37] and subsequent works on improving PBFT,
and (iii) Bitcoin [2] and its relationships with Byzantine consensus and BFT (Byzantine
Fault-Tolerance) systems.
Classic Definitions of Fault-tolerant Consensus
We consider the consensus problem in a point-to-point message-passing network, which is
modeled as an undirected graph. Without specifically mentioning, the communication network
is assumed to be complete in this survey, i.e., each pair of nodes can communicate with each
other directly. In the fault-tolerant consensus problem [20, 89], each node is given an input, and
after a finite amount of time, each fault-free node should produce an output – consensus algo-
rithms should satisfy the termination property. Additionally, the algorithms should also satisfy
appropriate validity and agreement conditions. There are three main categories of consensus
problems regarding different agreement properties:
• Exact [110, 78]: fault-free nodes have to agree on exactly the same output.
• Approximate [56, 59]: fault-free nodes have to agree on “roughly” the same output – the
difference between outputs at any pair of fault-free nodes is bounded by a given constant
ǫ (ǫ > 0) of each other.
• k-set [43, 51]: the number of distinct outputs at fault-free nodes is ≤ k.
Validity property is also required for consensus algorithms to produce meaningful outputs,
since the property defines the acceptable relationship between inputs and output(s). Typical
validity includes: (i) strong validity : output must be an input at some fault-free node, (ii) weak
validity : if all fault-free nodes have the same input v, then v is the output, and (iii) validity (for
approximate consensus): output must be bounded by the inputs at fault-free nodes. A consensus
algorithm is said to be correct if it satisfies termination, agreement and validity properties given
that enough number of nodes are fault-free throughout the execution of the algorithm. In this
paper, we focus on three types of node failures – Byzantine, crash, and omission faults. The
only exception is Section 2.3 where we discuss results on link faults.
The other key component of the consensus problem definition is system synchrony, i.e., a
model specifying the relative speed of nodes and the network delay. There are also three main
categories [20, 89, 58, 29]:
• Synchronous: each node proceeds in a lock-step fashion, and there is a known upper bound
on the message delay.
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• Partially synchronous: there exists a partially synchronous period from time to time. In
such a period, fault-free nodes and the network stabilize and behave (more) synchronously.1
• Asynchronous: no known bound exists on nodes’ processing speed or the message delay.
Outline
Section 2 discusses works that defined new consensus problems which either assumed variants
of aforementioned properties or introduced enriched correctness properties. The main purpose is
to give a big picture on the problem space that have been explored in the literature. In Section
3, we discuss recent efforts that bring consensus algorithms to practical systems. Consensus
is an important primitive that has wide applications such as state-machine replication (SMR)
[118], and distributed storage. We address three main applications: (i) crash fault-tolerant
systems that used variants of Paxos [78, 79] and Raft [105], (ii) Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT)
systems, and (iii) Bitcoin [101, 102], a popular cryptocurrency. For part (ii), we discuss several
techniques on improving the performance, including speculative execution, execution/agreement
separation, and hardware-based solution . . . etc. For part (iii), we focus on the comparison of
Bitcoin and Byzantine consensus and BFT systems. In Section 4, we conclude the survey, and
present some interesting future research directions.
2 Exploration of New Problem Formulations
Researchers have generalized the consensus problem from the classic definitions presented in
Section 1. We categorize these efforts into four groups: (i) input/output domain, (ii) communi-
cation network and synchrony assumptions, (iii) link fault models, and (iv) enriched correctness
properties, such as early-stopping and one-step properties. In this section (with the exception in
Section 2.3 when we discuss link fault models), we assume that there are n nodes in the system,
and up to f of them may become Byzantine faulty or crash. Byzantine faulty nodes may have
an arbitrary behavior.
2.1 Input/Output Domain
Multi-Valued Consensus In the original exact Byzantine consensus problem [110, 81], both
input and output are binary values. Later, references [88, 132] proposed the multi-valued version
in which input may take more than two real values. Recently, multi-valued consensus received
renewed attentions and researchers proposed algorithms that achieve asymptotically optimal
communication complexity (number of bits transmitted) in both synchronous and asynchronous
systems. Surprisingly, for an L-bit input, these algorithms achieve asymptotic communication
complexity of O(nL) bits when L is large enough.
In synchronous systems, Fitzi and Hirt proposed a Byzantine multi-valued algorithm with
small error probability [61]. Their algorithm is based on the reduction technique and has the
1Note that there are also other definitions of partial synchrony. We choose this particular definition, since
many BFT systems only satisfy liveness under this particular definition. Please refer to [58, 15] for more models
on partial synchrony.
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following steps: (i) hash the inputs to much smaller values using universal hash function, (ii)
apply (classic) Byzantine consensus algorithm using these hash values as inputs, and (iii) achieve
consensus by obtaining the input value from nodes that have the same hash values (if there is
enough number of such nodes) [61]. Later, Liang and Vaidya combined a different reduction
technique (that divides an input into a large number of small values) with novel coding technique
to construct an error-free algorithm in synchronous systems [85]. One key contribution is to
introduce a lightweight fault detection (or fault diagnosis) mechanism using coding [85]. Their
coding-based fault diagnosis is efficient because the inputs are divided into batches of small
values. In each batch, either consensus (on the small value of this batch) can be achieved
with small communication complexity or some faulty nodes will be identified. Once all faulty
nodes are identified, then consensus on the remaining batches becomes trivial. Since number of
faulty node is bounded, consensus on most batches can be achieved with small communication
complexity [85].
Subsequently, variants of reduction technique were applied to solve consensus problems with
large inputs in asynchronous systems. References [109, 108] provided multi-valued algorithms
with small error probability. Afterwards, Patra improved the results and proposed an error-
free algorithm [107]. These algorithms terminate with overwhelming probability; however, the
expected time complexity is large because these algorithms first divide inputs to small batches
and achieve consensus on each batch using variants of fault diagnosis mechanisms.
Typically, to achieve optimal communication complexity, the number of batches is in the
same order of L. Consequently, the number of messages is large, since by assumption, L is a
large value. Instead of achieving optimal bits, Moste´faoui and Raynal focused on a different goal
– minimizing number of messages in asynchronous systems [97, 99]. Their algorithm relies on
two new all-to-all communication abstractions, which have an O(n2) message complexity (i.e.,
O(n2L) bits) and a constant time complexity. The first one allows the fault-free to reduce the
number of input values to a small constant c, which ranges from 3 to 6 depends on the bound
on the number of faulty nodes. The second abstraction allows each fault-free nodes to obtain
a set of inputs such that, if the set at a fault-free node contains a single value, then this value
belongs to the set of any fault-free process. The algorithm in [97, 99] consists of four phases
such that (i) nodes exchange input values in the first three phases with the first phase based
on the first communication abstraction, and the two subsequent phases based on the second,
and (ii) nodes use binary consensus in the final phase to determine whether it is safe to agree
on the value learned from phase 3. Recently, Moste´faoui and Raynal proposed a new all-to-all
communication abstraction, validated broadcast, and showed how to used validated broadcast
to solve the Byzantine consensus problem in asynchronous systems [98]. The resulting algorithm
has the intrusion-tolerant property: if all the faulty nodes propose the same value v, while no
fault-free nodes proposes it, then v cannot be the output.
Multi-valued consensus has also been studied under the crash fault model in which nodes
may suffer fail-stop failures; otherwise, they follow the algorithm specification. Moste´faoui et
al. proposed multi-valued consensus algorithms in both synchronous and asynchronous systems
[11]. Later, Zhang and Chen proposed a more efficient multi-valued consensus algorithm in
asynchronous systems [143].
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High-Dimensional Input/Output In the Byzantine vector consensus (or multi-dimensional
consensus) [91, 134], each node is given a d-dimensional vector of reals as its input (d ≥ 1), and
the output is also a d-dimensional vector. In complete networks, the recent papers by Mendes
and Herlihy [91] and Vaidya and Garg [134] addressed approximate vector consensus in the
presence of Byzantine faults. These papers yielded lower bounds on the number of nodes, and
algorithms with optimal resilience in asynchronous [91, 134] as well as synchronous systems [134].
The algorithms in [91, 134] are generalizations of the optimal iterative approximate Byzantine
consensus for scalar inputs in asynchronous systems [14]. The algorithms in [91, 134] require
sub-routines for geometric computation in the d-dimensional space to obtain the local state in
each iteration; whereas, a simple average operation suffices when d = 1 [14]. These two papers
[91] and [134] independently addressed the same problem, and developed different algorithms –
mainly on different geometric computation techniques, which also result in different proofs.
Subsequent work by Vaidya [133] explored the approximate vector consensus problem in
incomplete directed graphs. Later, Tseng and Vaidya [129] proposed the convex hull consen-
sus problem, in which fault-free nodes have to agree on “largest possible” polytope in the d-
dimensional space that may not necessarily equal to a d-dimensional vector (a single point).
The asynchronous algorithm in [129] bears some similarity to the ones in [91, 134, 14]; however,
Tseng and Vaidya used a different communication abstraction to achieve the “largest possible”
polytope. Moreover, Tseng and Vaidya introduced a new proof technique to show the correctness
of iterative consensus algorithms when the output is a polytope [129].
2.2 Communication Network and Synchrony
The fault-tolerant consensus problem has been studied extensively in complete networks (e.g.,
[110, 78, 20, 89, 56]) and in undirected networks (e.g., [60, 54]). In these works, any pair of
nodes can communicate with each other reliably either directly or via at least 2f + 1 node-
disjoint paths (for Byzantine faults) or f + 1 node-disjoint paths (for crash faults). Recently,
researchers revisited assumptions on the communication network and enriched the problem space
in three main directions: directed graphs, dynamic graphs, and partial synchrony.
Directed Graphs Researchers started to explore various consensus problems in arbitrary
directed graphs, i.e., two pairs of nodes may not share a bi-directional communication channel,
and not every pair of nodes may be able to communicate with each other directly or indirectly.
Significant efforts have also been devoted on iterative algorithms in incomplete graphs. In
iterative algorithms, (i) nodes proceed in iterations; (ii) the computation of new state at each
node is based only on local information, i.e., nodes own state and states from neighboring nodes;
and (iii) after each iteration of the algorithm, the state of each fault-free node must remain in the
convex hull of the states of the fault-free nodes at the end of the previous iteration. Vaidya et al.
[135] proved tight conditions for achieving approximate Byzantine consensus in synchronous and
asynchronous systems using iterative algorithms. The tight condition for achieving approximate
crash-tolerant consensus using iterative algorithms in asynchronous systems was also proved in
[128].
A more restricted fault model – called “malicious” fault model – in which the faulty nodes
are restricted to sending identical messages to their neighbors has also been explored extensively,
5
e.g., [82, 83, 142, 84]. LeBlanc and Koutsoukos [82] addressed a continuous time version of the
consensus problem with malicious faults in complete graphs. LeBlanc et al. [84] have obtained
tight necessary and sufficient conditions for tolerating up to f faults in the network.
The aforementioned approximate algorithms (e.g., [135, 124, 84]) are generalizations of the
iterative approximate consensus algorithm in complete network [56, 59]. However, to accom-
modate directed links, the proofs are more involved. Particularly, for the sufficiency part, one
has to prove that all fault-free nodes must be able to receive a non-trivial amount of a state at
some fault-free node in finite number of iterations. The necessity proofs in the work on directed
graphs (e.g., [135, 84]) are generalizations of the indistinguishability proof [19, 60]. The main
contributions were to identify how faulty nodes can block the information flow so that (i) fault-
free nodes can be divided into several groups, and (ii) there exists a certain faulty behavior such
that different groups of fault-free nodes have to agree on different outputs.
There were also works on using general algorithms to achieve consensus – An algorithm is
general if nodes are allowed to have topology knowledge and the ability to route messages (send
and receive messages using multiple node-disjoint paths). Furthermore, unlike iterative algo-
rithms (e.g., [56, 14]), the state maintained at each node in general algorithms is not constrained
to a single value. Tseng and Vaidya [131] proved tight necessary and sufficient conditions on
the underlying communication graphs for achieving (i) exact crash-tolerant consensus in syn-
chronous systems, (ii) approximate crash-tolerant consensus in asynchronous systems, and (iii)
exact Byzantine consensus in synchronous systems using general algorithms. Lili and Vaidya
[124] proved tight conditions for achieving approximate Byzantine consensus using general al-
gorithms. The exact consensus algorithms in [131] also require that some information has to
be propagated to all fault-free nodes even if some nodes may fail. Generally, the algorithms in
[131] proceed in phases such that in each phase, a group of nodes try to send information to the
remaining nodes. The algorithms are designed to maintain validity at all time. Additionally, if
no failure occurs in a phase, then agreement can be achieved. The algorithm in [124] can be
viewed as an extension of the iterative algorithm in [135], which utilized the routing information
to tolerate more failures than the algorithm in [135] does.
Dynamic Graphs Researchers have also explored the consensus problem in directed dynamic
networks [25, 24, 40, 41, 119], where communication network changes over time. For synchronous
systems, Charron-Bost et al. [40, 41] solved approximate crash-tolerant consensus in directed
dynamic networks using iterative algorithms. In the asynchronous setting, Charron-Bost et
al. [40, 41] addressed approximate consensus with crash faults in complete graphs. Roughly
speaking, in the crash fault model, references [40, 41] and references [135, 131] independently
found out that it is necessary and sufficient to have a fault-free node that can reach every other
fault-free node in the dynamic graphs and directed graphs, respectively.
References [25, 119, 24] considered the message adversary, which controls the communication
pattern, i.e., the adversary has the power to specify the sets of communication graphs. Biely et
al. studied the exact consensus problem [24] and k-set consensus problem [25, 119] in dynamic
networks under the message adversary. All the nodes are assumed to be fault-free in [25, 119, 24],
and no message is tampered in message adversary model.
The algorithms in aforementioned papers share some similarity with their counter parts in
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complete graphs, e.g., [89, 20]. The main contributions of these papers are to identify concise
definitions of dynamic graphs so that useful information can be propagated to enough number
of nodes in the presence of faults or dynamic links.
Unknown and Anonymous Networks A network is unknown if the set and number of par-
ticipating nodes are previously unknown. Inspired by the observation that many self-organizing
systems initially behave as unknown networks, researchers studied fault-tolerant consensus in
unknown networks. The problem is named FT-CUP (Fault-Tolerant Consensus with Unknown
Participants). For crash faults, Cavin et al. [38] proposes the FT-CUP problem, and identi-
fied necessary and sufficient conditions on the system composition and synchrony conditions
in order to solve FT-CUP. The proposed algorithm is based on the usage of failure detectors.
Subsequently, Greve and Tixeuil [65] studied the tradeoff between knowledge connectivity and
synchrony condition. Knowledge connectivity represents each node’s “knowledge” (or view) of
the network, i.e., those nodes that are reachable. Their algorithm consists of two phases: (i)
identify a set of nodes that share the same view of the network, and (ii) execute traditional con-
sensus algorithm to reach consensus in the unknown networks. Alchieri et al. [16] extended the
problem to the Byzantine version, where some nodes may become Byzantine faulty. Their algo-
rithm also consists of two phases: identifying enough nodes and then using traditional consensus
algorithm among these nodes to solve the problem. To accommodate Byzantine behaviors, the
algorithm is more complicated than the one in [65], and the required knowledge connectivity is
different from the ones in [38, 65]. Note that the notion of knowledge connectivity is different
from the connectivity in communication network (e.g., directed or dynamic networks discussed
above). In [38, 65, 16], the underlying communication graph is assumed to be fully-connected
(i.e., complete network), and their algorithm does not work if the network is directed or dynamic.
There were also works on anonymous networks, in which the nodes do not have unique iden-
tity. Delporte-Gallet et al. [53] considered the problem of reaching consensus when nodes may
crash in anonymous networks. Their algorithms emulate shared memory and solve consensus
under different synchrony conditions. One main novelty is their “leader election” protocol that
works in anonymous networks. Their leader election protocol is different from the traditional
ones, because there may be multiple leaders; however, by carefully integrating the leader elec-
tion protocol, the algorithm ensures that as long as multiple leaders behave identically, the
consensus can be achieved [53]. For Byzantine consensus in synchronous anonymous networks,
Okun and Barak [104] considered the case when nodes are able to distinguish messages received
from different links (or ports). In these two papers, the system is partially anonymous in the
sense that for a given message, a node is still able to learn the source of the message [92], even
though the source may not have a distinct identity. In a completely anonymous network, a node
is not able to learn the source for any message, and there is no notion of links or ports. As
a result, for any two received messages, a node cannot know whether these two messages are
from the same source or from two different sources. Below, we discuss two works [92, 63] that
solved Byzantine consensus in completely anonymous network. Inspired by Bitcoin [101], Miller
and LaViola proposed a Byzantine consensus algorithm for asynchronous anonymous networks
that uses moderately-hard puzzles [92]. Such computational puzzles are useful in completely
anonymous networks, because they do not require the knowledge of identities and prevent the
(computationally bounded) adversary from gaining too much influence. The algorithm in [92] is
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Monte Carlo algorithm in the sense that it violates the validity condition with small probabil-
ity. Recently, Garay et al. [63] proposed an algorithm that satisfies validity with overwhelming
probability. The algorithm was also based on Bitcoin [101].
Partial Synchrony Alistarh et al. [18] considered k-set consensus in partially synchronous
systems, and presented the asymptotically tight bound on the complexity of set agreement in
such systems. Milosevic et al. [93] considered permanent and transient transmission faults in
a variation of partially synchronous systems, and proved necessary and sufficient conditions on
the number of nodes n to tolerate permanent and transient transmission faults. Hamouma et
al. [68] studied the consensus problem when only a few links may be synchronous throughout
the execution of the algorithm.
Alistarh et al. [17] addressed a fundamental question of partially synchronous systems: “For
how long does the system need to be synchronous to solve crash-tolerant consensus?” The core
idea of the algorithm in [17] relies on two mechanisms (i) detect asynchrony, and (ii) determine
when to update value safely (without violating the validity) based on asynchrony detection.
Bouzid et al. [29] studied the problem from a different aspect – how many eventually syn-
chronous links are necessary for achieving consensus? They introduced a notion of eventual
〈t + 1〉bisource which characterizes the necessary and sufficient timing condition to solve con-
sensus. This condition requires an existence of fault-free nodes such that it has an eventually
synchronous incoming links from f other fault-free nodes, and eventually synchronous outgoing
links to f other fault-free nodes. The proposed algorithm in [29] uses two novel components:
a new all-to-all communication abstraction for fault-free nodes to eventually agree on a set of
values, and an object to ensure that fault-free nodes eventually converge to a single value.
2.3 Link Fault Model
In addition to node failures, significant efforts have also been devoted to the problem of achieving
consensus in the presence of link failures [42, 26, 115, 116, 117]. Santoro and Widmayer proposed
the transient Byzantine link failure model: a different set of links can be faulty at different
time [115, 116]. The nodes are assumed to be fault-free in the model. They characterized a
necessary condition and a sufficient condition for undirected networks to achieve consensus in the
transient link failure model; however, the necessary and sufficient conditions do not match: the
necessary and sufficient conditions are specified in terms of node degree and edge-connectivity,2
respectively.
Subsequently, Biely et al. proposed another link failure model that imposes an upper bound
on the number of faulty links incident to each node [26]. As a result, it is possible to tolerate
O(n2) link failures with n nodes in the new model. Under this model, Schmid et al. proved
lower bounds on number of nodes, and number of rounds for achieving consensus [117]. Tseng
and Vaidya [130] considered the iterative consensus problem in arbitrary directed graphs under
transient Byzantine link failure model. In particularly, they showed the tight condition on the
underlying graphs for achieving iterative consensus.
2A graph G = (V, E) is said to be k-edge connected, if G′ = (V, E −X) is connected for all X ⊆ E such that
|X| < k.
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For exact consensus problem, it has been shown that (i) an undirected graph of 2f + 1
node-connectivity3 is able to tolerate f Byzantine nodes [60]; and (ii) an undirected graph of
2f + 1 edge-connectivity is able to tolerate f Byzantine links [116]. Researchers also showed
that 2f + 1 node-connectivity is both necessary and sufficient for the problem of information
dissemination in the presence of either f faulty nodes [125] or f fixed faulty links [126]. Unlike
the “transient” failure model, the faulty links are assumed to be fixed throughout the execution
of the algorithm in [126].
Charron-Bost and Schiper proposed the HO (Heard-Of) model that captures node failures
and message losses at the same time [42]. To the best of our knowledge, the HO model is the first
model unifying system synchrony and node crashes together. The HO model assumes round-
based algorithms, which consists of three steps: (i) send messages, (ii) receive messages, and (iii)
perform computation (specified by the algorithm). For each round r and each node i, letHO(i, r)
denote the set of nodes that node i has “heard of” at round r. Then the model also specifies a
set of communication predicates over all HO(i, r) to capture failures, message loss, or delayed
messages. The benefits of the HO models are: (i) it puts different types of failures in a unified
framework, including static, dynamic, permanent or transient faults, and (ii) compared with the
classic fault models, the impossibility proofs and correctness proofs (for given algorithms) are
in general shorter and simpler [42]. In [42], Charron-Bost and Schiper discussed communication
predicates that map to classic problem specification, e.g., “Synchronous system, reliable links, at
most f crash failures” or “Partially synchronous system, eventual reliable links, at most f crash
failures”, and identified the relationships among these communication predicates and solvability
of consensus problems specified in the HO model with these predicates. Subsequently, Biely et
al. generalized the model to “value faults”, which would corrupt values transmitted by nodes,
and thus, can be used to capture Byzantine node and link faults [27].
2.4 Enriched Properties
In addition to the termination, agreement, and validity conditions discussed in Section 1, there
were also researches on enriching or relaxing the correctness properties.
Early-Stopping Property In synchronous systems, an algorithm has an early-stopping prop-
erty if the algorithm can terminate early if there is less than f faults in an execution. Suppose
that given an execution, an actual number of faults in a system is t, where t ≤ f . It has been
shown that fault-tolerant consensus cannot be achieved in ≤ t + 1 rounds using determinis-
tic algorithms in synchronous systems [89]. That is, the lower bound of round complexity is
min{t + 2, f + 1} for crash faults [75], omission fault [106], and Byzantine faults [55]. In [55],
Dolev and Lenzen proposed a new property, namely early-deciding, which requires fault-free
nodes to decide early but the decided nodes may continue to send messages in to help other un-
decided nodes. They showed that an early-deciding algorithm requires more message complexity
than normal consensus algorithms [55]. The proof consists of two parts: (i) find a “pivotal” node
that is critical for whether the execution would result in output 0 or output 1, and (ii) ensure
that Ω(f2) messages have to be exchanged in certain rounds to achieve consensus. As a result,
3A graph G = (V, E) is said to be k-node connected, if G′ = (V −X, E) is connected for all X ⊆ V such that
|X| < k.
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they are able to show that for any min{t + 2, f + 1}-deciding binary consensus algorithm and
any 1 ≤ t ≤ f/2, there is an execution such that number of faults is t and fault-free nodes send
at least f2t/44 messages.
One-Step Property An asynchronous consensus algorithm has one-step property if in all
the executions that has no contention (i.e., all fault-free nodes propose the same input value),
the algorithm terminates within in one communication step. A communication step consists of
three events: (i) send messages, (ii) receive messages, and (iii) perform local computation and
update local state. One-step property is first proposed for crash-tolerant consensus algorithms
[30] and later extended to Byzantine consensus algorithms [62, 123]. These algorithms share
similar structures: (i) use communication primitives to exchange values, and produce output if
there is enough match, and (ii) use traditional consensus algorithms to achieve the consensus if
no output is generated in the first phase. Typically, the lower bound on the number of nodes to
achieve one-step property is more than the one for classic correctness properties (validity and
agreement). For example, it has been shown in [123] that n > 7f is necessary to achieve strong
one-step property, where n is the number of nodes in the system.
Almost-Everywhere Agreement King and Saia studied a slightly different problem called
almost-everywhere Byzantine agreement in synchronous systems with a strong adversary that
corrupt nodes adaptively [76]. The proposed algorithm has a very small communication over-
head, O˜(n1/2) bit per node; however, it has a small error probability. Such sacrifice is necessary
to overcome the lower bound proved in [57]. The core idea of the algorithm is based on itera-
tively performing local elections in a tournament network. To accommodate adaptive adversary,
King and Saia proposed two new techniques: (i) instead of electing a node in local election,
elect arrays of random number generated by some node, and (ii) use secret sharing to exchange
the contents of the arrays. Such techniques may be applied to overcome adaptive adversary in
other contexts. Note that their algorithm works even when input is a binary value [76], whereas,
multi-valued consensus algorithms achieve optimal communication complexity O(nL) only when
the input size L is large enough.
3 Exploration of Practical Applications
Fault-tolerant consensus has been adopted in many practical systems. We start with real-
world systems that are designed to tolerate crash node faults, particularly, those based on two
families of algorithms – Paxos [78] and Raft [105]. Then, we discuss efforts on designing systems
that tolerate more complex failures and BFT (Byzantine Fault-Tolerance) systems. Finally, we
compare Bitcoin-related work [101] with BFT systems and Byzantine consensus. Typically, these
systems satisfy correctness (or safety) in asynchronous network; however, to ensure progress (or
liveness), there must exist some time periods that enough messages are received within time. In
other words, these systems satisfy safety and liveness in partially synchronous systems.
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3.1 Paxos and Raft
Paxos [78, 79, 80, 94] is the well-known family of consensus protocols tolerating crash node
faults. Since Paxos was first proposed by Lamport [78, 79], variants of Paxos were developed and
implemented in real-world systems, such as Chubby lock service used in many Google systems
[31, 46], and membership management in Windows Azure [36].4 Yahoo! also developed ZaB
[113], a protocol achieving atomic broadcast in network equipped with FIFO channels, and used
ZaB to build the widely-adopted coordination service, ZooKeeper [72]. ZooKeeper is later used in
many practical storage systems, like HBase [5] and Salus [139]. Recently, many novel mechanisms
have been proposed to improve the performance of Paxos, including quorum lease [96], diskless
Paxos [127], even load balancing [95], and time bubbling (for handling nondeterministic network
input timing) [50]. While the original Paxos [78, 79] is theoretically elegant, practitioners have
found it hard to implement Paxos in practice [39]. One difficulty mentioned in [39] is that
membership/configuration management is non-trivial in practice, especially, when Multi-Paxos,
and disk corruptions are considered. (Multi-Paxos is a generalization of Paxos which is designed
to optimize the performance when there are multiple inputs to be agree upon [39].)
In 2014, Ongaro and Ousterhout from Stanford proposed a new consensus algorithm – Raft
[105]. Their main motivation was to simplify the design of consensus algorithm so that it is easier
to understand and verify the design and implementation. One interesting (social) experiment by
Ongaro and Ousterhout was mentioned in [105]: “In an informal survey of attendees at NSDI
2012, we found few people who were comfortable with Paxos, even among seasoned researchers”.
To simplify the (conceptual) design, Raft integrates the consensus solving part deeply with
leader election protocol and membership/configuration management protocol [105]. After their
publication, Raft has quickly gained popularity, and been used in practical key-value store
systems such as etcd [4] and RethinkDB [9]. Please refer to their website [8] for a list of papers
and implementations.5
3.2 Arbitrary State Corruption
Recently, researchers explored fault model beyond crash node failures. One such fault model is
called Arbitrary State Corruption (ASC) [47, 21, 22]. In the ASC fault model, the whole state
of a node may transition to an arbitrary state due to incidents like bit flips or hardware error.
However, the failure is not caused by a malicious adversary. Thus, it is generally assumed that
a message from a faulty node can be detected in the ASC model [21, 22]. Note that the ASC
model is a proper subset of Byzantine fault model, since Byzantine nodes can behave arbitrarily,
including sending messages in a way that may not be detected.
Correia et al. introduced a library, PASC, which relies on different check mechanisms (e.g.,
CRC code) to harden crash-fault tolerant algorithms against ASC faults [47]. PASC does not
replicate the entire node; rather, it replicates internal states of each node; thus, the overhead
4We would like to thank the anonymous reviewer who pointed out that Windows Azure also uses ZooKeepr
to manage virtual machines [1].
5Paxos has been the de facto standard of consensus algorithms for a long time [6]; however, we feel that it
is still of interests to discuss Raft as well, as Raft has gained more and more attentions in both academia and
industry [8].
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is moderate comparing to BFT replication (discussed in Section 3.3). Behrens et al. proposed
a framework to harden distributed systems using arithmetic codes, which is able to detect
transit and permanent hardware errors with high probability [22]. Subsequently, Behrens et
al.[21] observed that the technique in [47] does not manage memory usage efficiently, and the
mechanism in [22] incurs large latency due to the component for encoding executions. The
authors addressed the aforementioned issues, and used their technique to harden memcached [7]
with moderate overhead [21].
3.3 Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)
Since Castro and Liskov published their seminal work PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerance)
[37], significant efforts have been devoted to improving Byzantine Fault-Tolerance (BFT). There
were mainly two directions of the improvements: (i) reducing the overhead like communication
costs, or replication costs, and (ii) providing higher throughput or lower latency (in the form
of round complexity). Generally speaking, BFT system replicates deterministic state machines
over different machines (or replicas) to tolerate Byzantine node failures. In other words, BFT
systems implement the State Machine Replication systems [118] that tolerate Byzantine faults.
The main challenge is to design a system such that it behaves like a centralized server to the
clients in the presence of Byzantine failures. More precisely, the system is given requests from
the clients, and the goals of a BFT system are: (i) the fault-free replicas agree on the total order
of the requests, and then the replicas execute the requests following the agreed order (safety);
and (ii) clients learn the responses to their requests eventually (liveness). Usually, liveness is
guaranteed only in the grace periods, i.e., when messages are delivered in time. In other words,
BFT systems satisfy safety and liveness in partially synchronous networks.
Improving Performance Castro and Liskov’s work on Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerance
(PBFT) showed for the first time that BFT mechanism is useful in practice [37]. PBFT requires
3f+1 replicas, where f is the upper bound on the number of Byzantine failures in the whole sys-
tem. Subsequently, Quorum-based solutions Q/U [12] and HQ [49] have been proposed, which
only require one round of communication in contention-free case (when no replica fails, and the
network has stable performance and no contention on the proposed input value happens) by
allowing clients directly interact with the replicas to agree on an execution order. Such type of
mechanisms reduced latency (number of rounds required) in some case, but was shown to be
more expensive in other cases [77]. Hence, Zyzzyva [77] focused on increasing performance in
failure-free case (when no replica fails) by allowing speculative operations that increase through-
put significantly and adopting a novel roll-back mechanism to recover operations when failures
are detected. Zyzzyva requires 3f + 1 replicas; however, a single crash failure would signifi-
cantly reduce the performance by forcing Zyzzyva protocol to run inthe slow mode – where no
speculative operation can be executed [77]. Thus, Kotla et al. also introduced Zyzzyva5, which
can be executed in fast mode even if there are crash failures, but Zyzzyva5 requires 5f + 1
replicas [77]. Subsequently, Scrooge [121] reduced the replication cost of Zyzzyva5 by requiring
the participation from clients which help detect replicas’ misbehaviors.
Clement et al. observed that a single Byzantine replica or client can significantly impact
the performance of HQ, PBFT, Q/U and Zyzzyva [45]. Thus, they proposed a new system
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Aardvark, which provides good performance when Byzantine failures happen by sacrificing the
failure-free case performance [45]. Later, Clement et al. also demonstrated how to combine
Zyzzyva and Aardvark so that the new system, Zyzzyvark, not only tolerates faulty clients, but
also enjoys fast performance in the failure-free case by leveraging speculative operations [44].
The aforementioned BFT systems are designed to optimize performance for certain circum-
stances, e.g., HQ for contention-free case and Zyzzyva for failure-free case. Guerraoui et al.
proposed a new type of BFT systems that can be constructed to have optimized performance
under difference circumstances [66]. Their tunable design is useful, since it provides the flexibility
of choosing different performance trade-off according to the network performance and applica-
tion requirements. Their systems are based on three core concepts: (i) abortable requests, (ii)
composition of (abortable) BFT instances, and (iii) dynamic switching among BFT instances.
The tunable parameter specifies the progress condition under which a BFT instance should not
abort. Some example conditions include contention, system synchrony or node failures. In [66],
Guerraoui et al. showed how to construct new BFT systems with different parameter; partic-
ularly, they proposed (i) AZyzzyva which composes Zyzzyva and PBFT together to have more
stable performance than Zyzzyva does and faster failure-free performance than PBFT’s perfor-
mance, and (ii) Aliph which has three components: PBFT, Quorum-based protocol optimized
for contention-free case, and Chain-based protocol optimized for high-contention cases without
failures and asynchrony [66].
For computation-heavy workload, Yin et al. proposed to separate agreement protocol from
executions of clients’ requests [141]. This separation mechanism reduces the replication cost to
2f + 1. Note that the system still requires 3f + 1 replicas to achieve agreement on the order
of the clients’ requests, but the executions of requests, and data storage only occur at 2f + 1
replicas. Later, Wood et al. built a system, ZZ, which reduces the replication cost to f+1 using
virtualization technique [140]. The idea behind ZZ is that f +1 active replicas are sufficient for
fault detection, and when fault is detected, their virtualization technique allows ZZ to replace
the faulty replica by waking up fresh replica and retrieving current system state with small
overhead [140].
Hardening Crash-Tolerant Systems Since most existing systems are designed to tolerate
crash faults, there are efforts on hardening existing crash-tolerant systems against Byzantine
fault models. Note that systems discussed in Section 3.2 were not designed to tolerate Byzan-
tine faults, because Arbitrary State Corruption is strictly weaker than Byzantine fault model.
Haeberlen et al. was among the first to propose using log-based detection mechanism to hard-
ening crash-tolerant systems [67]. They proposed a library called PeerReview that can be used
to detect Byzantine faults, and such detection can be irrefutably linked to faulty nodes – the
identity of faulty nodes can be eventually learned by all fault-free nodes. Unfortunately, as dis-
covered by Ho et al. [70], PeerReview can only be used to detect a subset of Byzantine failures.
Ho et al. proposed Nysiad [70], which transforms crash-tolerant protocols to Byzantine-tolerant
protocols by assigning a set of guards to verify each replica’s behavior. However, Nysiad needs
a logically centralized service to perform configuration change, which incurs high overhead [47].
UpRight [44] is an architecture which integrates BFT and crash-tolerant systems together with
small overhead. UpRight has inherited ideas from three prior systems: speculative execution
[77], robustness to clients’ failure [45], and agreement/execution separation [141]. One novelty
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of UpRight is the introduction of the shim layers for clients and servers for existing existing
crash-tolerant systems that can order clients’ requests and verify results from servers. Clement
et al. used UpRight library to make ZooKeeper [72] tolerate Byzantine faults [44].
Hardware-based BFT Different from the aforementioned software-based BFT mechanisms,
researchers also proposed using trusted hardware components to reduce the replication costs or
to increase performance. MinBFT [136] uses trusted hardware to build an unique sequential
identifier generator, which is then used to verify messages from each replica. With such scheme,
MinBFT only requires 2f+1 agreeing replicas. CheapBFT [74] relies on an FPGA-based trusted
components to authenticate messages, and is able to tolerate all-but-one failures, i.e., it only
requires f + 1 replicas. Recently, Istva´n et al. proposed a novel idea of using FPGA to achieve
Byzantine-tolerant consensus and atomic broadcast [73]. Then, they showed how to use their
FPGA-based atomic broadcast to make ZooKeeper tolerate Byzantine faults with small overhead
(compared to crash-tolerant one). One down side of their mechanism is that the developers need
to implement an application-specific network protocol [73].
Relaxed BFT Inspired by the popularity of real-world eventually consistent systems (e.g.,
[3, 52]), researchers proposed relaxed safety and liveness properties for BFT systems. CLBFT
sacrifices liveness for higher safety, i.e., tolerating more replica failures, by increasing the quorum
size (in proportion of the number of replicas) [114]. Zeno [122] chose eventual consistency to
provide higher availability when network partition happens. Depot [90] only ensures a fork-
join-causal consistency (a model slightly weaker than causal consistency) to eliminate “trust”
for safety – a client needs to trust only himself to ensure the safety property. Prophecy [120]
focuses on increasing throughput for read-heavy workloads; however, Prophecy only provides
delay-once consistency (a new consistency model weaker than strong consistency [120]), and
relies on a trusted component to detect misbehaviors. Liu et al. proposed the concept of XFT
(cross fault-tolerance), which relax the degree of fault-tolerance [86]. Particularly, XFT is correct
only when all the following conditions hold: (i) only crash faults happen in asynchronous periods;
and (ii) non-crash faults (Byzantine faults) happen only in synchronous periods (grace periods).
By relaxing the guarantees, the authors build XPaxos which has comparable performance of
crash-fault-tolerant systems and tolerates Byzantine faults (in grace periods) [86].
BFT Storage System There are also BFT systems specifically designed for storage systems.
Goodson et al. proposed an erasure-coded storage system tolerating Byzantine replicas and
clients using 4f + 1 replicas [64]. The main technique to detect faulty client writing different
values to different replicas is having the next fault-free client detect the inconsistency (This
scheme is possible due to the benefit of coding). Based on this system, Abd-El-Malek et al. pro-
posed a lazy verification protocol to reduce client’s workload, which shifts the work to storage
replicas during idle time [13]. However, the scheme still requires 4f + 1 replicas, and consumes
high bandwidth [69]. Later, Hendricks et al. built another erasure-coded storage system [69]
which relies on a short checksum comprised of cryptographic hashes and homomorphic finger-
prints to optimize the throughput in the contention-free case (when no replica fails, and the
network has stable performance and no contention happens). The system requires 3f + 1 repli-
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cas. Recently, Cachin et al. built a BFT storage system, MDStore, which only requires 2f + 1
replicas under the assumption that the client is always fault-free when writing data [33, 34].
MDStore system had two novelties: (i) separation of data and metadata storage, and (ii) meta-
data service based on lightweight cryptographic hash functions. MDStore tolerates any number
of Byzantine readers and crash-faulty writers and up to f Byzantine faulty replicas.
Cloud-of-Clouds The idea of building BFT storage systems over intercloud (or cloud-of-
clouds) becomes popular lately, since as discussed in [137], the assumption of failure inde-
pendence holds naturally due to the different cloud administrators, geographical locations and
implementations from different cloud service providers. Cachin et al. proposed a layered ar-
chitecture for BFT storage systems over intercloud, ICStore (abbreviating InterCloud Storage)
[35]. One novelty of ICStore is to provide different dependability goals: (i) confidentiality, (ii)
integrity, and (iii) reliability and consistency. ICStore’s layered architecture allows clients to
choose different levels of dependability and performance by selecting different operation point
for each layer [35]. Independently, Bessani et al. proposed DEPSKY, a BFT storage system
supporting efficient encoding and confidentiality [23] with 3f +1 replicas. However, the liveness
property is slightly weakened in DEPSKY, i.e., the read protocol ensures responses only when a
finite number of contending writes happen. Lately, He et al. proposed NCCloud, which focuses
on both fault tolerance and storage repair [71] and is based on a new regenerating code that has
low repair cost and can be used to detect a Byzantine behaviors.
3.4 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a digital currency system proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto [101] and later gained pop-
ularity due to its characteristics of anonymity and decentralized design [2]. Since Bitcoin is
based on cryptography tools (Proof-of-Work mechanism), it can be viewed as a cryptocurrency.
Even though Bitcoin has large latencies (on the order of an hour), and the theoretical peak
throughput is up to 7 transactions per second [138], Bitcoin is still one of the most popular
cryptocurrencies. Here, we briefly discuss the core mechanism of Bitcoin and compare it with
Byzantine consensus and BFT systems.
Bitcoin Mechanism The core of Bitcoin is called Blockchain, which is a peer-to-peer ledger
system, and acts as a virtually centralized ledger that keeps track of all bitcoin transactions.
A set of bitcoin transactions are recorded in blocks. Owners of bitcoins can generate new
transactions by broadcasting signed blocks to the Bitcoin network.6 Then, a procedure called
mining confirms the transactions and includes the transactions to the Blockchain (the centralized
ledger system). Essentially, mining is a randomized distributed consensus component that
confirms pending transactions by including them in the Blockchain. To include a transaction
block, a miner needs to solve a “proof-of-work” (POW) or “cryptographic puzzle”. The main
incentive mechanism for Bitcoin participants to maintain the Blockchain and to confirm new
transactions is to reward the participants (or the miners) some bitcoins – the first miner that
6Here, we follow the convention of Bitcoin literature: (i) Bitcoin network consists of all the anonymous par-
ticipants in the Bitcoin system. Note that in previous sections, network means the communication network; and
(ii) throughout the discussion, “Bitcoin” means the system, whereas, “bitcoin” means the virtual money.
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solves the puzzle receives a certain amount of bitcoins. The main reason that the mining
procedure can be related to consensus is because each miner maintains the chain of blocks
(Blockchain) at local storage, and the global state is consistent at all miners eventually – all
fault-free miners will have the same Blockchain eventually [101]. That is, anonymous Bitcoin
participants need to agree on the total order of the transactions.
One important feature of the cryptocurrency system is to prevent the double-spending at-
tacks, i.e., spending some money twice. In Bitcoin, the consistent global state – the order of
transactions – can be used to prevent double-spending attacks, since the attackers have no abil-
ity to reorganize the order of blocks (i.e., modify the Blockchain, the ledger system). In [101],
Satoshi Nakamoto presented a simple analysis that showed with high probability, Bitcoin’s par-
ticipants maintain a total order of the transactions if adversary’s computation power is less than
1/3 of total computation power. As a result, no double-spending attack is possible with high
probability if adversary’s computation power is bounded. However, the models under consider-
ation were not well-defined and the analysis was not rigorous in [101]. Thus, significant efforts
have been devoted to formally proving the correctness of Bitcoin mechanism or improving the
design and performance. Please refer to [102] for a thorough discussion. Below, we focus on the
comparison of Bitcoin and Byzantine Consensus/BFT systems.
Comparison with Byzantine Consensus There are several differences between the problem
formulation of Byzantine consensus (as described in Section 1) and the assumptions of Bitcoin
[63, 92, 101], such as in Bitcoin, (i) the number of participants is dynamic; (ii) participants
are anonymous, and the participants cannot authenticate each other; (iii) as a result of (ii),
participants have no way to identify the source of a received message; and (iv) the Bitcoin
network is able to synchronize in the course of a round, i.e., the network communication delay
is negligible compared to computation time.
It was first suggested by Nakamoto that Bitcoin’s POW-based mechanism can be used to
solve Byzantine consensus [100, 10]. However, the discussion was quite informal [100]. To the
best of our knowledge, Miller and LaViola were the first one to formalize the suggestion and
proposed a POW-based model to achieve Byzantine consensus when majority of participants are
fault-free. However, the validity is only ensured with non-negligible probability (but not with
over-whelming probability). Subsequently, Garay et al. [63] extracted and analyzed the core
mechanism of Bitcoin [63], namely Bitcoin Backbone. They first identified and formalized two
properties of Bitcoin Backbone: (i) common prefix property: fault-free participants will possess
a large common prefix of the blockchain, and (ii) chain-quality property: enough blocks in the
blockchain are contributed by fault-free participants. Then, they presented a simple POW-based
Byzantine consensus algorithm which is a variation of Nakamoto’s suggestion [100], but satisfy
agreement and validity assuming that the adversarys computation power (puzzle-solving power)
is bounded by 1/3. Their algorithm can also be used to solve Byzantine consensus with strong
validity [103]. Finally, they proposed a more complicated consensus protocol, which was proved
to be secure assuming high network synchrony and that the adversarys computation power is
strictly less than 1/2. In [63], Garay et al. focused on how to use Bitcoin-inspired mechanism
to solve Byzantine consensus.
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Comparison with BFT System Conceptually, BFT and Bitcoin have similar goals:
• BFT : clients’ requests are executed in a total order distributively, and
• Bitcoin: a total order of blocks are maintained by each participant distributively.
Therefore, it is interesting to compare BFT with Bitcoin as well. Below, we address fundamental
differences between the two.
• Formulation: As discussed above, model assumptions for BFT are similar to the ones for
Byzantine consensus, which are very different from the ones for Bitcoin. One major differ-
ence is the anonymous node identity. In BFT, the system environment is well-controlled,
and replicas’ IDs are maintained and managed by the system administrators. In contrast,
Bitcoin is a decentralized system where all the participants are anonymous. As a result,
BFT systems can use many well-studied tools from the literature, e.g., atomic broadcast,
and quorum-based mechanism, whereas, Bitcoin-related systems usually rely on POW
(proof-of-work) or variants of cryptographic tools.
• Features: In [138], Marko Vukolic mentioned that the features of BFT and Bitcoin are
at two opposite ends of the scalability/performance spectrum due to different application
goals. Generally speaking, BFT systems offer good performance (low latency and high
throughput) for small number of replicas (≤ 20 replicas), whereas, Bitcoin scales well
(≥ 1000 participants), but the latency is prohibitively high and throughput is limited.
• Incentive: In BFT system, every fault-free replica/client is assumed to follow the algorithm
specification. However, in Bitcoin, participants may choose not to spend their computation
power on solving puzzles; thus, there is a mechanism in Bitcoin to reward the mining
process [101].
• Correctness property: As addressed in Section 3.3, BFT systems satisfy safety in asyn-
chronous network and satisfy liveness when network is synchronous enough (in grace pe-
riod). As shown in [101, 63], Bitcoin requires network synchronous enough for ensuring
correctness (when network delay is negligible compared to computation time).
In [138], Marko Vukolic proposed an interesting research direction on finding the synergies
between Bitcoin-related and BFT systems, since both systems have its limitations. On one
hand, the poor performance of POW-based mechanism limits the applicability of Blockchain
in other domains like smart contract application [138, 28]. On the other hand, BFT systems
are not widely adopted in practice due to their poorer scalability and lack of killer applications
[86, 137]. SCP is a recent system that utilizes hybrid POW/BFT architecture [87]. However,
further exploration of the synergy between Bitcoin and BFT systems is an interesting research
direction.
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4 Conclusion and Future Directions
4.1 Conclusion
Fault-tolerant consensus is a rich topic. This paper is only managed to sample a subset of recent
results. To augment previous surveys/textbooks on the same topic, e.g., [48, 111, 32, 89, 20], we
survey prior works from two angles: (i) new consensus problem formulations, and (ii) practical
applications. For the second part, we focus on the Paxos- and Raft-based systems, and BFT
systems. We also discuss Bitcoin which has close relationship with Byzantine consensus and
BFT systems.
4.2 Future Directions
The identified future research directions focus on one theme: bridging the gap between theory
and practice. As discussed in the first part of the paper, researchers have explored wide variety
of different (theoretical) problem formulations; however, there is no consolidated or unified
framework. As a result, it is often hard to compare different algorithms and models, and it is
also difficult for practitioners to decide which algorithms are most appropriate to solve their
problems. Thus, making these results more coherent and more practical (e.g., giving rule-of-
thumbs for picking algorithms) would be an important and interesting task.
In the second part, we discuss the efforts of applying fault-tolerant consensus in real systems.
Unfortunately, the difficulty in implementing or even understanding the consensus algorithms
prevents wider applications of consensus algorithms. Therefore, simplifying the (conceptual)
design and verifying the implementation is also a key task. Raft [105] is one good example of
how simplified design and explanation could help gain popularity and practicability. Another
major task is to understand and analyze more thoroughly the real-world distributed systems.
As suggested in [138, 63], BFT systems and Bitcoin are not yet well-understood. The models
presented in [63, 92] and other works mentioned in [138] were only the first step toward this goal.
Only after enough research and understanding, could we improve the state-of-art mechanisms.
For example, as mentioned in [102], Bitcoin’s core mechanism depends on the incentives to
reward miners; however, not much work has analyzed Bitcoin from the perspective of game
theory.
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